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ON COST-INFORMED PRICING AND CUSTOMER VALUE:
A RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE PERSPECTIVE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION
PRICING PRACTICES
Abstract
By empirically  testing a fiarnework  of pricing strategies and their determinants  in air
industrial  setting, Noble and Gruca (1999a) help to overcome  the lack of empirical
validation  of pricing theory. In a commentary to the article, Cressman (1999) (1)
expresses worries about the high percentage of firms  that engages  in tost-based picing;
(2) raises a definition  question on value-based pricing; and (3) stresses that empirical
pricing literature does not provide  ideas on successful pricing practices in relation to
customer value created. The aim of this study is to respond to calls for research on
successtil  pricing practices. A perspective Com resource-advantage theory (Hunt and
Morgan 1995) is used to formulate expectations on the degree to which the use of
information on customer value, competition, and costs contributes  to the success of a
price decision. It is argued that the success of these practices is contingent on the relative
customer value the fïrm has created and the degree to which this position of relative value
is sustainable in the competitive  market place. These expectations are empirically tested
on pricing decisions with respect to the introduction of new industrial capita1 goods. It is
concluded  that Noble and Gruca’s (1999a)  findings  on tost-based pricing can be
complemented,  since our results show that under most circumstances tost-informed
pricing makes an important contribution to the success of a price setting. The positive
effect of tost-informed pricing on pricing success is particularly important in situations of
high competitive  intensity. Value-informed pricing has in this situation a negative impact
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on pricing success. In situations where  the fïrrn introduces  a new product with high
relative value, value-informed pricing contributes more and competition-informed pricing
contributes less to pricing success. Cost-informed pricing has no effect on the success of
a price decision in this situation. In addition, our study comes across several
measurement issues that may have influenced results of prior surveys on pricing
practices. By providing a theoretical foundation and empirical evidente  on successful
organizational pricing practices in relation to customer value, the authors hope to
introduce a perspective on pricing that contributes to an understanding of how price
decisions are actually made in business.
(Pricing Research; Industrial Marketing; Competitive Strategy)
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INTRODUCTION
By empirically  testing a fiarnework  of pricing strategies and their determinants  in an
industrial  setting, Noble and Gruca (1999a) help to overcome  the lack of empirical
validation of pricing theory (Monroe and Mazumdar 1988). Their research effort made
clear that om- understanding of how price decisions are made by organizations is stil1  far
from complete (Cressman 1999, Noble and Gruca 1999b).  In a commentary to the article,
Cressman (1999) raised three important issues regarding Noble and Gruca’s (1999a)
fïndings.
First, Cressman expresses worries about the high percentage of fírms in Noble and
Gruca’s (1999a) sample that engages  in tost-based pricing (56 %), suggesting that these
fïrrns  are ignorant towards the market in price decisions. These worries reflect the general
belief in marketing that tost-based pricing is a bad practice  (e.g. Dean 1950, Nagle and
Holden 1990). Although Coe (1990) shows that an increase of tost-based pricing goes
hand in hand with a decrease of innovation strategies, the lack of effectiveness of cost-
based pricing has so far been an assumption that is never tested. Second,  Cressman raises
a definition question: What is value(-based) pricing? Does value-based pricing refer to a
pricing strategy as ‘a means  by which a pricing objective  is to be achieved’ (Noble and
Gruca 1999a,  p. 436),  or does value-based pricing refer to the use of information on
customer value in a pricing decision? Third, Cressman stresses that empirical pricing
literature does not provide  studies on successful pricing practices  in relation to the firrn’s
efforts to create customer value: ‘How  is it possible that we advocate managers adopt a
market orientation, but the literature fails to link pricing practices  with the drivers of
customer needs? If pricing practice  is seen as the means  through which managers
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“harvest”  the “seeds” planted in a market-oriented strategy process, why are there no
pricing practices based on the value delivered to  customers  in the  m&eting literature?’
(Cressman 1999, p. 456).
The third issue is of special importante  because it does not relate  to research findings
or definitions of concepts, but to the relevante  of the research question itself. Rather  than
examining to what extent firms  base prices on customer value, costs, or other
information, Cressman actually argues that researchers should examine under  which
value-creating conditions the use of this information leads to successful pricing decisions.
This comment is in line with prior calls for research on how firms set prices. Monroe and
Mazumdar  (1988) see a lack of understanding of how price  decisions are actually made
as a major shortcoming in pricing literature, while Bonoma,  Crittenden and Dolan (1988)
even suggest that it brought about a lack of managerial relevante  of pricing literature in
general.  Cressman’s critique led Noble and Gruca (1999b,  p. 459) echoe these calls,
stating that: ‘Research on successful pricing process should be a major priority for future
research. In such a research endeavor, the defhritions  of customer value and value-based
pricing should be clear  enough to avoid the potential for confùsion between academie  and
practitioner users of the results.’
In this paper, we aim to contribute  to answering Noble and Gruca’s (1999b)  call,
taking into account Cressman’s (1999) useíùl  suggestions. In particular, we wil1  make
three contributions to empirical pricing literature. First, our study is the first  to examine
the success of three pricing practices with respect to different types of information used
in a pricing process (respectively on costs, customer value and competition). Second,  we
wil1  do so in relation to the relative customer value offered by new products  and the
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degree of sustainability  of this value. The theoretical foundation for this  is provided by
the resource-advantage theory of competition (Hum  and Morgan 1995, 1997). Third, OUT
study comes across several measurement issues that may have influenced Noble and
Gruca’s (1999a) findings, as wel1  as other prior surveys on pricing practices. Like Noble
and Gruca (1999a) we present data Com industrial capita1 industries, which can be used
for a possible reinterpretation of their fïndings on the use of tost  information in prking.
Our results reveal that the success of information on value, competition and costs is
contingent on the relative value offered by a product, as wel1  as on the degree to which
value is sustainable in the market. This suggests that there is no genera1 “bad” or “best”
practice  with respect to the type of information used in price  decisions.
In the next section  we wil1  introduce the concepts included in our study. Next, we use
resource-advantage theory (Hunt  and Morgan 1995) to formulate expectations on the
conditions under which information on costs, competition and customer value contibutes
to successful  price  decisions. The expectations are tested on 77 introductions of industrial
capita1 goods. The empirical method and results are presented next. In the discussion
section we wil1  discuss  why Noble and Gruca’s (1999a) results may be influenced by
several measurement issues, and how they should be interpreted in the light of the
findings obtained in our study. We conclude with some interesting avenues for future
research.
CONCEPTS
Pricing practices should be distinguished from pricing objectives  and pricing strategies.
Pricing objectives  refer to what the firm is trying to accomplish with its price setting, and
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pricing strategy refers to the means  by which a pricing objective  is to be achieved in the
market (Noble  and Gruca 1999a).  Pricing practices on the  other hand, refer to the set of
activities executed by an organization’s managers that lead to  a price  decision.’ As such,
pricing practices occur in the context of an organizational process, leading to decisions on
pricing strategies and price levels. Thus, whereas pricing strategies are visible in the
market in the form of price changes,  price bundles, price levels within a product line,  or
otherwise, pricing practices are hidden behind the botmdaries  of the organization.
Following Day (1994) we consider pricing to be an organizational process of information
gathering, exchange and interpretation, that involves discussion and negotiations between
different business functions such as marketing, production and finance.  This view on the
pricing process is in line with qualitative work on pricing in organizations (e.g. Bonoma,
Crittenden and Dolan  1988, Hague 1971, Foxall 1972, Pearce 1956).
.
The empirical pricing literature generally distingurshes among three types of pricing
practices (e.g. Piercy 1981, Tzokas, Hart, Argouslidis and Saren 2000, Udell 1972),
respectively based on the use of information regarding (1) customer value  (following
Hum and Morgan (1995), defíned as the sum of total benefits  customers perceive they
wil1  receive  if they accept the market offering); (2) competition (here defïned as prices of
competitors’ products  interpreted in the light of their relative market positions); and (3)
costs @ere  defined  as the variable and fïxed  costs with respect to the development,
production and marketing of the new product). These different types of information are
’ Prior contributions to empirical pricing literature (e.g. Tzokas, Hart, Agrouslidis and Saren  2000) often
use the term pricing methods to indicate  the activities by which farms  arrive at price settings. Since the term
pricing methods is often  interpreted as mutually exclusive methods, we prefer the term pricing practices,
which is in line with our view on pricing as an organizational process that involves organizational practices
in which organizations engage  to some degree (Day 1994).
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important because they represent the basic  elements in the intemal and extemal
enviromnent  of the fírm on which prices  can be based (Nagle  and Holden 1995).
In the context of a pricing process, firms are likely to use al1 three types of
information to some extent, rather  than focus on a single one. This implies that the use of
customer value, competition and tost  information, should be seen as something of
degree, rather  than mutually exclusive  categories.  For this reason we wil1  use the terms
tost-informed,  competition-informed and value-informed pricing, in stead of tost-based,
competition-based and value-based pricing. This conceptualization is in line with Noble
and Gruca’s (1999a) finding  that firrns  combine tost-based pricing with pricing strategies
that require input of market information.
[Figure l]
When engaged in a pricing process, organizations should indicate  and choose from a
number of acceptable  price  settings for a product. A.clear  understanding of the range of
acceptable  price  settings wil1  contribute  to successful  decision making  (Monroe 1990).
Whereas value- and competition-informed pricing enhance the organization’s
understanding of the upper-limit of this range, tost-informed pricing does so about the
lower-limit (Monroe 1990). As such,  we expect that value-, competition-, and cost-
informed pricing wil1  affect pricing success, as indicated in Figure 1. Since a pricing
process generally starts with determining pricing objectives  (Diamantopoulos 1991,
Hague 1971),  we define  pricing success accordingly as the degree to which pricing
objectives  are achieved.
The degree  to which pricing practices  contribute  to pricing success is contingent on
the customer value context (Eagle  and Holden 1995). We include two specifïc
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dimensions: product advantage and competitive intensity. Product advantage refers to the
sum of total benefits customers perceive to obtain compared to competitors’ products. As
such,  it refers to the actual relative value the product offers. Competitive intensity relates
to the degree to which product advantage is likely to be sustainable. Under conditions of
high competitive intensity, created customer value erodes  faster  than under conditions of
low competitive intensity. In the next section we wil1  formulate expectations on how
these dimensions moderate the relationship between value-, competition-, and cost-
informed pricing and pricing success.
PRICING IN THE LIGHT OF RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE THEORY
According to resource-advantage theory (Hunt  and Morgan 1995, 1997),  a firm strives
for superior financial  performance by enabling its resources to Capture  a position of
competitive advantage in a certain market or market segment. This position is captured:
(1) if the fïrm creates more customer value than competitors do at lower or equal costs
compared to competitors, or (2) if the fïrrn creates equal customer value compared to
competitors at lower costs.  This situation is represented in Figure 2 by cells  2, 3 and 6
(see Hunt and Morgan 1995 for an elaborate explanation of the competitive position
matrix). Firms can improve their competitive position by introducing proactive or
reactive  product innovations to the market. Proactive innovations offer superior customer
value and reactive  innovations offer customer value equal to competitors (Hunt and
Morgan 1997).
[Figure 21
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Value-, competition-, and tost-informed pricing al1 may positively affect pricing
success (Eagle  and Holden 1995),  but the degree to which they do depends on the
customer value context of the product. Table 1 distinguishes  between three  contexts  with
respect to the customer value offered by a new product and the degree to which value is
likely to be sustainable: (1) high product advantage; (2) high competitive intensity;  and
(3) high product advantage and high competitive intensity. In terms of Figure 2 product
advantage represents the relative customer value dimension. Competitive intensity
represents the degree to which a position of relative value captured by an innovation is
likely to be sustained. For example, a product representing a high degree of advantage
that contributes  to a competitive position in cel1 3 in Figure 2 at its launch,  is in a highly
competitive market pushed to cel1 2 when a competitor launches a reactive  innovation, or
even to cel1 1 when a competitor introduces  a proactive innovation.
[ T a b l e  l]
Value-informed pricing informs the firm about the ceiling  of the range of acceptable
price settings for a new product. It establishes a maximum price  that depends on the
actual product advantage (Monroe 1990). Thus, the higher  the benefïts  offered by the
product, the larger the range of acceptable  price  settings, the more value-informed pricing
wil1  contribute  to pricing success (cel1 1 in Table 1). Under conditions of high
competitive intensity, relative value is likely to erode  faster thereby narrowing the range
of acceptable  price  settings (Monroe 1990). Thus, under conditions of high competitive
intensity the effect of value-infotmed pricing on pricing success, is likely to decrease
(cel1 2). In the situation that a product with a high advantage over competitors’ products
is launched  in a market with intense competition, both effects  are likely to occur: the
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effect of value-informed pricing wil1  increase because of the high product advantage, hut
at the same time  it wil1  decrease because of the  intense competition. This means  that the
positive  effect of value-informed pricing on pricing success is not expected to increase  or
decrease under this condition (cel1 3).
Competition-informed pricing informs the firrn about the kling of the range of
acceptable price settings, under the condition that the product is a reactive  innovation:  a
product that is launched with the objective  to match a competitor’s position of superior
value. Because the value offered by the product is equal to that of a competitor’s product,
the competitor’s price setting determines the ceiling  of the range of acceptable price
settings. If the product does have a higher  advantage than competitors’ products,
competition-informed pricing does not inform the firm about the acceptable range of
price settings. Thus, the higher  product advantage, the weaker the effect of competition-
informed pricing on pricing success (cel1 4). Competitive intensity is not expected to
affect the success of competition-informed pricing (cel1 5),  because it wil1  not affect the
role of competition-informed pricing in determining the range of acceptable price
settings. Under the condition of high product advantage and high competitive intensity,
this means  that we expect to fïnd  a negative effect (cel1 6).
Cost-informed pricing informs the firm about the lower-limit of the range of
acceptable price settings (Monroe 1990). As such,  tost-informed pricing wil1  contribute
more to pricing success when the lower limit of the price setting determines whether the
product wil1  Capture a position of competitive advantage or not. Reactive  innovations
only contribute  to a position of competitive advantage if they can be brought to the
marl&  at a lower price (resulting from a lower tost  position) compared to competitors
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(cel1  2 in Figure  2). AS  such,  firms  need a better understanding of their tost  position when
product advantage is relatively lower in order to understand to what extent they can
undercut  competitors’ price settings of products that offer equal value. In other words: for
products that have a high advantage over competitors’ products, tost-informed  pgcing
wil1  contribute  less to pricing success (cel1 7 in Table 1). In a situation  of high
competitive intensity, danger exists that the product is pushed to a position  of lower
value, in which it only contributes  to a position of competitive advantage if the price can
be dropped (cel1 1 in Fig,ure 2) (Hum  and Morgan 1995). In order to do so, the firm wil1
need a thorough understanding of its lower-limit in the range of acceptable  price settings.
Thus, in situations of high competitive intensity, the effect of tost-informed pricing on
pricing success is expected to increase (cel1 8 in Table 1). Finally, if a product is launched
with a high advantage over competitors’ products in a market with intense competition,
we expect that the negative effect of product advantage is neutralized by the positive
effect of competitive intensity on pricing success (cel1 9 in Table 1).
The expectations indicated in Table 1 should be viewed in the context of industrial
capita1 goods. First, customer value can relatively easy be quantified  in these markets,  for
instance  by an increase of the customer’s turnover  andor  a decrease of the customer’s
costs (Anderson  and Narus  1998). Second,  the purchasing process of industrial capita1
goods is likely to be less obscured by psychological effects  in value- and price
perceptions than it is in many  other markets  (Monroe 1990). The purchase of industrial
capita1 goods is typically a group-process that involves intense information gathering
(Ward and Webster 1991). Third, capita1 goods industries have relatively high unit costs
and fixed investments. As such,  the consideration of tost  information might be more
important than in other markets  (Noble and Gruca 1999b).
METHOD
Data Collection and Sample
Like in Noble and Gruca’s (1999a) survey, a questionnaire was developed focussing on
the latest  new product development and launch  in which the respondent’s  compmy  had
been involved. This approach avoids the critique on studies examining overall pricing
objectives  and strategies (Diamantopoulos 1991). Questionnaires were mailed to the
marketing or genera1 manager in the company.
A questionnaire was mailed to 590 firms drawn from a comprehensive Belgian
industry database. The respondents were contacted by telephone prior to the mailing in
order to request co-operation.  Afier  receipt of the questionnaire, a recall-phone cal1 was
made and repeated every two weeks. Respondents were reminded up to three times.  A
total of 78 questionnaires was finally retumed, representing a response rate of 13.2 %.
One questionnaire was removed from the sample since it had too many  missing values.
Overall, considering the complexity and sensitivity of the subject and length of the
questionnaire, the response rate is satisfactory (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch
1996). We tested nonresponse bias by comparing early, average  and late respondents
(Armstrong and Overton 1977). In t-tests for al1 variables included in this study, no
significant differences in the mean responses were found. We asked respondents to
indicate  on a lO-point scale  to what degree they were involved in the price setting of the
new product. Nearly 80% of the respondents rated this degree with a 6 or higher,
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suggesting that the questionnaire generally targeted the appropriate respondents within
companies. Further we examined correlations between the degree to which respondents
were involved in the price setting and the measures included in our study. NO significant
correlations were found, suggesting that a possible bias in our results as a consequente  of
respondent-selection within companies is unlikely.
Our sample consists of firms from the electronics  and engineering industries. This
sample is based on a subset of the industries examined by Noble and Gruca (1999a), who
focus on firms producing industrial capita1 goods. The industries that are included in our
sample cover 73 % of the industries in Noble and Gruca’s (1999a) net sample. Since it is
the objective  of our study to test the effectiveness of pricing practices, we conducted a
series of interviews to select industries in which fïrms  generally do not suffer from a high
degree of demand  uncertainty which may affect the degree to which prices  are based on
specific  factors (Noble and Gruca 1999a).
Measurement
To measure value-, competition-, and tost-informed pricing as wel1  as pricing success,
new multiple-item measures were developed. After  defining  the domain of the constructs,
an item pool was created on the basis of an extensive literature review and interviews in
various industries (Churchill 1979). Items were measured using a lO-point scale, the
upper-end indicating “played a major role in price setting”, and the lower-end indicating
‘Xvas not important at al1 in price setting”. Many  prior studies use mutually exclusive
category indicators to measure pricing practices (e.g. Piercy 1981, Udell 1972),  which do
not accurately tap the degree to which different kinds of information are used. Also single
1 1
Iitem measures (Tzokas et al. 2000) and summated scales (Noble  and &uca 1999a)  are
unlikely to accurately tap the information used in a pricing process, for two reasons. First,
like the domains of many  concepts in social sciences, the domains of value-, competition-
and tost-informed pricing as defined  in this study,  are toe braad to be measured by a
single item (Churchill 1979). Second,  asking  managers about the information used in a
pricing process may be prone to a social response bias, since managers are likely to
justify prices on the basis of costs (Foxall 1972, Pearce 1956).
In order to minimize the risk of a social response bias, items on customer value,
competition and tost  factors were presented in the questionnaire in random order, also
including a number  of additional items not measuring any of the three groups of pricing
factors included in this study. As a final check on a possible social response bias in value-
, competition-, and tost-informed pricing, we conducted 10 interviews. In 5 interviews
we asked managers to fill out a questionnaire with purified  scales of which the items
measuring factors on which prices are based were presented in random order. After  they
finished,  we asked them to describe the pricing process of the new product, as wel1  as to
indicate  what kind of information they used and on what information the final price
setting is based, using the interview techniques advised by Pearce (1956) and Foxall
(1972). In the other 5 interviews we followed the same procedure but started with the
open questions and finished  with the questionnaire. In al1 10 interviews, the stories told
by the managers generally fit the answers to the questionnaire. This leads US to conclude
that a social response bias is not a problem in our scales.
With respect to pricing success, measured as the degree to which pricing objectives
are achieved, firms  may set multiple objectives,  but generally set a profit  and an output
12
objective  of either a maximizing or satisfïcing  nature  (Diamantopoulos 1991).  For ais
reason we included scale items regarding the degree to which profit  and output objectives
of both a maximizing and satisficing  nature  are achieved. Since these items loaded on ene
factor we constructed a genera1 scale of achieving price objectives as the dependent
variable in our study. Items on the achievement of pricing objectives were also measured
on a ZO-point scale, the lower end indicating “wasn’t reached at ah”  and the upper  end
indicating “was completely reached”. Measures on product advantage and competitive
intensity were derived fi-om  Atuahene-Gima (1995).
Afier  collecting the data, al1 measures used in this study were subjected  to purifïcation
using factor analysis (Churchill 1979). Items that had very  weak loadings or loaded on
more than one factor were eliminated. To enhance discriminant validity, items that relate
directly to pricing strategies as studied by Noble and Gruca (1999a) were included, like
the degree to which the price is based on leaming curve effects  (skimming), penetration,
or product line. These items generally loaded on more than one factor which supports our
view that pricing strategies are the result  of a pricing process in which different sources
of information are used. Next, the reliability coefficient  alpha  of each measure was
calculated and item-to-total correlations were inspected. Items with low correlations were
eliminated. The fínal scales closely represent the concepts’ domains as they were initially
defïned.
The use of lO-point scales has the advantage that it is the most common rating scale in
Belgium, for instance  in the education system. It has a disadvantage in that extreme
scores may strongly  impact the mean of al1 scale items. For this reason we standardized
item scores before calculating the scale means, which satisfïes  the condition  that al1 scale
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items are equally important (Churchill 1979). Al1 scales used in this study are reported in
the appendix.
Theory Testing Approach
The three contingency situations of new product launch  were each tested in a moderating
regression model, following Sharma, Durant  and Gur-Arie’s  (1981)  two-step approach
for testing moderating effects. In the first  step we ran moderating regressions  analyses
including simple effects of al1 components,  as wel1  as multiplicative  interaction ter-ms  of
independent and proposed moderator variables (e.g. value factors multiplied by product
advantage) (Irwin and McClelland  2001). Significant interaction terms suggest the
existente  of pure moderators, which implies that the moderator variable (product
advantage, competitive  intensity) modifies  the form of the relationship between the
independent variable (e.g. tost-informed pricing) and the dependent variable @icing
success).
If no significant interaction is found one should examine the existente  of a different
type of moderators, so called homologizers (Sharma, Durant and Gur-Arie 1981).
Homologizers influence the strength of the relationship, but don’t interact with the
predictor. Value-informed pricing might for instance  explain more pricing success
variante  in situations of high product advantage than in situations of low product
advantage. Homologizers can be tested for by partial correlation analysis within
subgroups, created on the basis of a median split of the proposed moderating variable. A
significant differente  between the two situations using Fisher’s Z-test, indicates  the
existente  of a homologizer. Subsample analyses are only allowed if there is no significant
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correlation of the proposed moderator variable with the dependent or independent
variable (Slater  and Narver  1994).
RESULTS
The results  of the three moderating regression analyses are presented in Table 2. Results
of subsample tests for homologizers are listed in footnotes below Table 2.
[Table 21
The simple effects suggest that value- and tost-informed pricing generally contribute  to
pricing success, whereas competition-informed pricing generally has no effect. These
fíndings suggest that in genera1 value-informed pricing informs the fkm  about the upper-
limit and tost-informed pricing about the lower limit in the range of acceptable  price
settings and that a better understanding of this range enhances pricing success. The
simple effects also show a significant relationship between competitive intensity and
pricing success. This is in line with Diamantopoulos and Mathews’ (1994) finding  that
pricing objectives  depend  on the fïrm’s  environment. More specifícally,  we explain the
effect as that firms  in highly competitive environments are more satisfíed with achieving
price objectives  than fírms  in stable environments and thus report higher  scores on
pricing success.
With respect to our fíndings on high product advantage, we fmd a significant positive
effect for value-informed and a significant negative effect for competition-informed
pricing. We fínd  no effect for tost-informed pricing, but a subsample test reveals that
tost-informed  pricing contributes  signifkantly less to pricing success in situations of high
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product advantage than in situations of low product advantage. These findings  are in line
with our expectations.
In situations of high competitive intensity, we find  a negative effect for value-
informed, a positive effect for tost-informed and no effect for competition-informed
pricing, which confums  our expectations. A subsample test here is not allowed since
there is a significant correlation between competitive intensity and pricing success.
In situations of high product advantage and competitive intensity, we find  no effect for
value-informed, a negative effect for competition-informed and a positive effect for cost-
informed pricing. A subsample test on value-informed pricing is not significant. The
positive effect of tost-informed  pricing is contrary to our expectations. We wil1  discuss
this finding  in the next section.
DISCUSSION
The objective  of our paper is to improve our understanding of successful  practices by
means  of which firms  arrive at price decisions, as this has been repeatedly emphasized as
a major gap in empirical pricing literature (Bonoma,  Critenden and Dolan  1988, Monroe
and Mazumdar 1988, Noble and Gruca 1999b). Specifically, we focused on the degree to
which different types of information contribute  to pricing success under different
conditions of customer value creation and different degrees to which customer value is
likely  to be eroded by competitive forces. Our results show that the success of using
information on customer value, competition and costs in price decisions, is contingent on
the customer value created and the competitive intensity of the market. This suggests that
the success of pricing practices is not as straightforward as sometimes suggested (e.g.
16
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Cressman  1999). In addition, we note that prior surveys on the use of inforrnation  in pfice
decisions may suffer from shortcomings with respect to several measurement issues (Goe
1990, Noble  and Gruca 1999a,  Piercy 198 1, Tzokas, Hart, Argouslidis and Saren 2000,
Udell 1972).
Our results on price decisions for new product introductions in markets  for industrial
capita1 goods suggest that value-informed pricing helps the  firm in achieving  its pficing
objectives.  The rational behind this finding is that value-informed pricing  generally
increases the organization’s understanding about the upper-limit  in the range of
acceptable price settings. If product advantage is high, the upper-limit  of the range of
acceptable price settings is higher,  and value-informed pricing thus becomes more
important. However,  in markets  with intense competition, the contribution of value-
informed pricing to pricing success decreases, since the actual advantage is less
sustainable over time.  If the product has no superior advantage over competitors’
products, but aims to attack a competitor’s superior position - a reactive  innovation -
competition-informed pricing contributes  more to success. In this situation, competition-
informed  pricing informs the organization on the upper-limit  of acceptable prices  for this
type of innovation.
Our results also suggest that tost-infonned  pricing increases the organization’s
understanding  of the lower-limit of the range of acceptable price settings, thereby
contributing  to pricing success. This is especially the case in competitively intense
markets, where  products  might need to compete  more on price over time.  The
contribution  of tost-informed  pricing to pricing success is also contingent on product
advantage. However,  we fmd here a subtle differente  compared to our expectations.
1 7
Products  with a low  advantage compared to competitors (reactive  innovations) only
obtain  a position of competitive advantage if they can be offered to customers at a lower
price than competitors’ products. For this reason tost-infonned  piicing has a streng  effect
on pricing success for this type of innovation. However,  this  finding  doesn’t imply that
tost-informed pricing has a negative effect on pricing success for products  with  a high
advantage. For this type of innovation, organizations may also inform themselves  about
the lower-limit of the acceptable  price settings, but this practice  generally does nat
increase, nor decreases pricing success. As such,  the only situation in which cost-
informed pricing is decreasingly successml,  is under very  low competitive intensity.
In addition, our study comes across four measurement issues that may have affected
Noble and Gruca’s (1999a)  findings  as wel1  as findings  from other studies. First, pricing
practices  are different Com pricing strategies and thus should not be included in the same
measurement instrument (Coe 1990, Noble and Gruca 1999a). Pricing practices  refer to
the use of information in a pricing process that leads to price decisions, and pricing
strategies refer to how the fïrm tries to achieve  its pricing objectives  in the market place.
Second, the use of al1 three kinds of information (customer value, competition and costs)
should be included. Including only tost  information in a study as Noble and Gruca
(1999a)  do, wil1  lead to an incomplete picture of the degree to which firms  neglect  market
information  in their price decisions. Third, in the context of a pricing process, fïrms  are
unlikely to rely  exclusively on a single kind of information. Thus, a measure with
multiple mutually  exclusive  categories  (Coe 1990, Piercy 1981, Udell 1972) is less likely
to Capture  the diversity in the types of information used in a pricing process.  Fourth,
measuring the degree to which firms  use different types of information in a pricing
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process might be prone to a social response bias. Managers tend to justifjr  prices in terms
of costs in order to leave  an impression of a “fair” pricing practice  (Pearce 1956, Foxall
1972). For these reasons we developed new multiple-item measures on the concepts  of
tost-informed,  value-informed, and competition-informed pricing that indicate  the  degree
to which different kinds of information are used to arrive at a price decision.
Taking into account these measurement issues and the contribution of tost  information
to pricing success, the high percentage of fïrms  that indicated that they engage  in cost-
based pricing in Noble and Gruca’s (1999a)  research does not seem surprising after  all.
Their fïnding may not imply that these firms are ignorant of their market, the contrary
may be the case: firms evaluate their competitive  position for which a clear
understanding of their tost  positions is a necessary condition  for the product to survive on
the market. Our fíndings  are in line with Noble and Gruca’s (1999a)  finding  that demand
uncertainty antecedes tost-based pricing. In situations of high competitive  intensity, the
demand  for the new product becomes difficult to predict. Under these circumstances
firms don’t just rely  increasingly on tost  information, it also helps them to make
successful  price decisions.
As suggested  by Nagle and Holden (1995) and Cressman (1999) our findings  indicate
that creating customer value, followed by a price decision based on mis,  is a route to
pricing success. However,  there is no simple rule that states that pricing success wil1
improve if prices are based more on customer value information. Also the degree to
which value can be sustained is an important consideration. In situations in which firms
have little competition, or value can be sustained otherwise - for instance  through
protection by patents - a combination of creating customer value and value-informed
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Ipricing wil1  pay off. We find that new products  that intend to match the value offered by
competitors, are best priced on the basis of competitor information. For example, this
seems to be a safe approach for companies  following strong market leaders in highly
concentrated  markets.  The finding  that the use of tost  information has no negative effect
on pricing success in situations in which the firm has created superior customer value,
and that it even has a positive effect in situations of intense competition, shines a new
light on the results of prior studies. For instance, Coe (1990) interpreted an increase of
tost-based pricing throughout the 1980s as a consequente  of a parallel decrease of
innovation strategies. Our results suggest that the increased use of tost  information in
pricing can also be caused by the growing competition during that decade.
Limitations and Future Research
This study also has some limitations that present opportunities for future research. First,
our study is limited to the selected industries and in its geographical scope. We limited
our sample to a subset of industries examined by Noble and Gruca (1999a).  Future
research may test the generalizability of fïndings presented in this study in contexts  other
than industrial capita1 goods.
Our study is theoretically limited to dimensions of product advantage and competitive
intensity, that moderate the effectiveness of pricing practices  in new product launch.
Following the rationale of resource-advantage theory (Hunt and Morgan 1995),  also
relative product costs may impact the effectiveness of pricing practices. This is an
interesting avenue for further  research. Future research may also focus on other aspects of
the pricing process, such as the degree to which it is formally planned, the involvement of
2 0
different business Iùnctions,  and its relationships with actual resources, such as market
orientation.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Customer Value Context :
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Figure 2: Competitive Position Matrix a
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aRead:  The marketplace position of competitive  advantage identitïed  as Cel1 3 results
from the fnm, relative to its competitors, having a resource assortment  that enables it
toproduce an offeringfor some market segment(s) that (a) is perceived to be of
superior value and (b) is produced  at lower  costs.
Source: Hunt and M organ  (1997)
2 5
Table 1: Expectations on the Success  of Pricing Practices in Different Situations of
Value Creation and Sustainability’
Customer Value Context:
High product High
High product
advantage competitive
advantage and high
intensity competitive intensity
Pricing Practice:
1 2 3
Value-Informed + 0
4 5 6
Competition-Informed 0
7 8 9
Cost-Infonned + 0
“Read:  (cel1 1) the higher product advantage, the more value-informed  pricing contributes  to pricing
success.
Table 2: Results of Moderating Regression Analyses (Standardized Coeffkients)
Dependent variable: Pricing Success
Product
A d v a n t a g e
a n d
Product Competitive Competitive
Simnle  effects:
A d v a n t a g e Intens@ Int&siQ
Value-informed pricing
Competition-infonned  pricing
Cost-informed pricing
Product advantage
Competitive intensity
Product advantage * competitive intensity
.55” .25” .3gb
-.04 .02 .08
.2gb .22d .17
.09 .18
.31b .24d
-.16
Interaction effects of txoduct  advantage with:
Value-informed pricing
Competition-informed pricing
Cost-informed pricing
.32”
-.33b
.06’
eraction effects of comnetitive intens@;
Value-informed pricing
Competition-informed pricing
Cost-informed pricing
-.37b
-.03
.21’
Interaction effects of product advantage * competitive
intensitv. with;
Value-informed pricing
Competition-informed pricing
Cost-informed pricing
-.142
-.28’
.31’
Df 69 ,  7 69 ,  7 67 ,  9
F 5.82” 6.78” 5.00”
Adj usted R2 .31 .35 .32
‘2:  p < .OOl ‘: negative homologizer: ri,,,  = .33,  Yhigh =  .Og,  z =  5.64,~  < .OOO.
b: p < .Ol 2: no homologizer found: ~-1~~  = ..35,  Yhigh = .40,  z = 1.17, not significant.
c:p  < .05
d:p  < .l
APPENDIX: SCALE ITEMS AND RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS
Pricing Practices
To what degree were the following factors included in the price setting process of the
new product? In other words: to what extent did you take into account the following
elements while determining the price of the new product?
Vak-Informed Pricing (Alpha  = .81)  (Eigen value = 3.05) Factor loading
The advantages of the product compared to competitors’ products .83
The customer’s perceived value of the product .63
The advantages the new product offers to the customer .72
The balance between advantages of the product and price .64
The advantages of the product compared to substitutes .77
Competition-Informed Pricing (Alpha  = .91)  (Eigen value = 6.52) Factor loading
The price of competitors’ products .78
The competitor’s current price strategy .90
The estimation of competitor’s strength to react .81
The market structure  (number and strength of competitors) .87
The degree of competition on the market .79
The competitive  advantages of competitors on the market .76
Cost-Informed Pricing (Alpha  = .75)  (Eigen value = 2.41)
The variable costs of the product
The price necessary for break-even
The investments in the new product
The share of fixed costs in the tost  price
Factor loading
.82
.66
.75
.75
Product advantage (Alpha  = .74)  (Eigen value = 1.61) Factor loading
Please indicate  to what degree the following statements are typical for the new
product:
The product offered higher  quality than competing products
(Atuahene-Gima 1995)
.83
The product solved problems customers have with competing products .64
(Atuahene-Gima 1995)
The product was very  innovative and substituted an inferior altemative .78
(Atuahene-Gima 1995)
Competitive Intens@ (Alpha  = .73)  (Eigen value = 1.49) Factor loading
Please indicate  to what degree the following statements are typical for the
market in which the new product is launched:
Intense price competition (Atuahene-Gima 1995) .88
Strong competitor sales, promotion and distribution systems .63
(Atuahene-Gima 1995)
Strong and good quality competing products or services (Atuahene-Gima 1995) .55
Pricing Success  (Alpha  = .89)
(Eigen value = 5.16)
Factor loading
To what extent were the following price  obiectives  effectively achieved with
the new product:
Achieving a certain market share .68
Maximizing market share .74
Maximizing profïts .73
Achieving a certain pay back period .77
Achieving a predetermined ROI .82
Realize a certain growth in profits .83
Maximize the profítability of the product over the entire life cycle .69
Results of factor analysis are reported afier  a varimax rotation.
